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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This case involves a question of claim preclusion: what 
steps must a plaintiff take to bring about the consolidation 
of her consecutively filed cases in the district court so that 
claims in the later case are not precluded by the earlier 
action? In particular, the district court barred appellant 
Mary Churchill by a judgment on the pleadings from 
proceeding with a law suit, Churchill v. Star Enterprises, 3 
F. Supp.2d 625 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Churchill II"), alleging 
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act because she already 
had brought a suit, Churchill I, based on the same facts 
and related issues against the defendants in Churchill II, 
asserting claims in Churchill I under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 3 F. 
Supp.2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Churchill I"). 
 
We will affirm the district court's judgment on the 
pleadings in Churchill II because the two cases involved the 
same parties and germane facts, as well as related issues, 
and for claim preclusion purposes constituted a single 
cause of action that should have been joined in a single 
case. We also will affirm the district court's order on the 
Appellees' cross-appeal from the denial of an order under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 seeking sanctions against Churchill for 
filing Churchill II. Finally, we will affirm on Churchill's 
separate appeal from an order denying in part her 
application for attorney's fees in Churchill I. 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Background 
 
The facts that we find material to our disposition of these 
appeals are not contested. Churchill began work at Star 
Enterprises, a.k.a. Star Staff Inc. ("Star Staff"), in July 
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1991 managing a food mart at a Texaco station in 
Pennsylvania. In June 1996, Churchill was diagnosed with 
oral cancer. She then notified her temporary supervisor, 
Walter Schreiber, of her condition and of her need to 
undergo treatment. During the next two months she 
underwent three surgical procedures and between August 
and October 1996, she received radiation treatments. 
Churchill was limited substantially in performing major life 
activities, and thus was disabled, but nevertheless 
continued to work. Churchill made numerous requests to 
Star Staff for reasonable accommodations during this time, 
communicating these requests to David Smith, her 
manager, and Joseph Jantorno, her regional manager, but 
they were unresponsive. On January 29, 1997, Churchill 
made a final request for accommodation, and put Star Staff 
on notice that due to her medical needs she qualified for 
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 
U.S.C. SS 2601-2654 ("FMLA"). Jantorno then instructed 
Smith to evaluate Churchill and then Jantorno and Smith 
consulted with Deborah Cox of Star Staff's Human 
Resources Department regarding the case. Star Staff 
terminated Churchill on February 5, 1997, because of her 
disability. Churchill I and II and these appeals followed. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
       1. Churchill I 
 
Churchill initiated Churchill I on May 20, 1997, against 
Star Staff and three of its employees: Jantorno, Smith, and 
Bernadine Lane, who replaced her as the station manager. 
Churchill alleged that Star Staff, Jantorno, and Smith 
violated the FMLA when they discharged her and also were 
liable to her on common law claims for bad faith and 
wrongful discharge.1 She charged Lane with defamation, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. FMLA grants an "eligible employee" the right to 12 work weeks of 
leave, over any 12-month period: (1) because of the birth of the 
employee's child, in order to take care of the child; (2) because of the 
placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care; (3) in 
order to care for the employee's child, spouse, or parent, if the child, 
spouse or parent has a serious health condition; or (4) because of a 
serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the 
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but dropped that count on December 19, 1997, and 
dismissed Lane as a defendant. 
 
The district court entered judgment on January 27, 
1998, for the three remaining defendants on the state law 
claims because FMLA preempted them. Trial began on the 
other counts on February 11, 1998, and on February 13, 
1998, the jury rendered its verdict for Churchill, holding 
the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages of 
$8,609.02, plus interest at 6.5%, or $559.59. The court 
doubled the award as liquidated damages, finding that the 
defendants' violation of FMLA was not in good faith. On 
February 17, 1998, the court entered judgment for 
$18,337.22, and ordered that Churchill be reinstated to a 
position equivalent to her prior position with equivalent 
wages and benefits. 
 
Churchill then sought attorney's fees of $52,018.20, as 
well as costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(3). On April 
17, 1998, the district court issued a Memorandum and 
Order partially granting and partially denying Churchill's 
fee application and ordering the defendants to pay 
$37,062.50 for attorney's fees and $9,410.19 costs. 
Churchill filed a motion for reconsideration of that order, 
which the court denied by an order entered on May 28, 
1998. On this appeal, Churchill seeks reversal of the 
portion of the order denying attorney's fees for (1) time 
spent in connection with an unemployment compensation 
hearing on March 26, 1997, on a claim Churchill brought 
after her discharge and (2) for time to prepare for and 
conduct a deposition of Lane. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
functions of the employee's position. 29 U.S.C.S 2612(a)(1). After a 
period of qualified leave, an employee is entitled to reinstatement to her 
former position or an equivalent one with the same benefits and terms. 
29 U.S.C. S 2614(a). FMLA declares it "unlawful for any employer to 
interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to 
exercise, 
any right provided" in the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. S 2615(a)(1). FMLA similarly 
declares it "unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other 
manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice 
made unlawful" under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. S 2615(a)(2). Section 2917(a) 
of FMLA authorizes civil damage actions by employees. 29 U.S.C. 
S 2617(a). 
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       2. Administrative Claims 
 
Churchill pursued her claims against Star Staff along 
parallel courses. Thus, on February 26, 1997, Churchill 
filed an administrative complaint alleging disability 
discrimination with the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission ("PHRC"), and at that time her administrative 
complaint was dual filed with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting an American 
with Disabilities Act claim. The PHRC dismissed the 
disability discrimination claim on or about November 14, 
1997, and on April 26, 1998, Churchill received a right to 
sue letter dated April 24, 1998, from the EEOC. As we will 
discuss, she had not requested a right to sue letter. 
 
       3. Churchill II 
 
On April 2, 1998, about two months after the jury 
reached its verdict in Churchill I, Churchill filed a complaint 
against the Appellees, Star Enterprises, Jantorno, and 
Smith, under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 
42 U.S.C. SS 12101 et seq. (Counts I and II); the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. SS 951 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1998) (Counts III 
and IV); and the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. SS 34:11-B1 et seq. (West Supp. 1999) (Counts V and 
VI).2 The Appellees answered the complaint on April 23, 
1998, including as an affirmative defense the contention 
that Churchill's claims were "barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata," and that Appellees had "fully satisfied the court's 
judgment entered February 17, 1998 . . . ." There is no 
doubt that the Appellees' answer raised the res judicata 
defense in reliance on the proceedings in Churchill I and 
Churchill does not contend otherwise. 
 
The district court on Appellees' motion to dismiss entered 
a judgment for the Appellees on the pleadings on June 23, 
1998, on claim preclusion principles because Churchill II 
and Churchill I "involved the same cause of action." 
Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 628. On July 21, 1998, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Churchill's complaint was apparently premature with respect to her 
ADA claim as she brought it before she received the right to sue letter. 
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Churchill appealed in Churchill II, seeking reinstatement of 
her ADA and PHRA Counts.3 
 
       4. Star Staff's Rule 11 Motion 
 
On May 1, 1998, the Appellees served Churchill with 
notice that they intended to seek sanctions against her for 
filing Churchill II and unless she withdrew that case within 
21 days they would file the motion for sanctions. Obviously, 
Churchill did not comply with their request and on May 29, 
1998, when the Appellees filed their motion to dismiss 
Churchill II on res judicata grounds, they also moved for 
sanctions in the form of reimbursement of attorneys' fees 
and costs incurred in bringing the motion. Although, as we 
have indicated, the district court granted the Appellees 
judgment on the pleadings, it denied their motion for 
sanctions "under the totality of the circumstances." 
Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 631. 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We exercise plenary review of the order for judgment on 
the pleadings, see Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, 
Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988), and thus of the 
application of claim preclusion in Churchill II, see Rider v. 
Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982, 988-95 (3d Cir. 1988), and we 
review the denial of Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of 
discretion, see Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal 
Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 
1988). On Churchill's appeal from the partial denial of her 
attorney's fee application in Churchill I we exercise an 
abuse of discretion standard. See EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 
123 F.3d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Claim Preclusion 
 
This case seems to present the first application in any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Churchill does not appeal from the dismissal of the New Jersey Family 
Leave Act counts. She apparently brought that claim because Star 
Staff's office is in New Jersey. 
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court of appeals of claim preclusion barring the assertion of 
claims following a case already litigated under FMLA.4 Yet 
while the constellation of facts in this case is new, the 
principles of the doctrine of claim preclusion are familiar. 
Moreover, the circumstance that FMLA and the interests it 
protects are involved in this case does not mean that we 
should honor Churchill's request that we depart from those 
principles. In particular, this case implicates issues 
involving Churchill's failure to seek a stay of Churchill I so 
that her claims in Churchill II could have been joined in 
that action. It also involves consideration of Churchill's 
failure to seek a right to sue letter from the EEOC so that 
she could have expedited bringing Churchill II. 
 
The district court decided that the fact that there are 
administrative procedures that a plaintiff must follow before 
she pursues a PHRA or ADA claim in court did not justify 
the court in refusing to apply claim preclusion principles. 
The court in reaching its decision indicated that Churchill 
could have expedited the administrative procedures and 
sought a stay of Churchill I so that the PHRA and ADA 
claims could have been included in that case. 
 
Churchill argues that she should not have been required 
to seek a stay of Churchill I because a stay, by delaying her 
opportunity to obtain relief under FMLA, would have 
prejudiced her and frustrated public policy. She alternately 
argues that she did move for a stay in Churchill I. She 
further argues that she should not have been required to 
request that the EEOC expedite issuance of the right to sue 
letter in order to exhaust the administrative claims. For the 
reasons that follow we reject those arguments, and uphold 
the district court's application of claim preclusion 
principles. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We have found only one other opinion which applied claim preclusion 
to a suit involving an FMLA allegation; however, that case involved 
preclusion of the reasserted FMLA claim itself, not allegations under 
other statutes. Solien v. Physicians Business Network, Inc. 22 F. Supp.2d 
1237 (D. Kan. 1998) (res judicata precluded plaintiff 's FMLA suit where 
defendant prevailed on motion for summary judgment). 
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       1. The claims in Churchill II required administrative 
       exhaustion. 
 
As we have indicated the court granted Appellees' motion 
for judgment on the pleadings on Churchill's ADA and 
PHRA claims in Churchill II.5 Unlike the FMLA, both the 
ADA and the PHRA require pursuit of administrative 
remedies before a plaintiff may file a complaint in court. 
Thus, a party who brings an employment discrimination 
claim under Title I of the ADA must follow the 
administrative procedures set forth in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5. See Bishop v. 
Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.N.J. 1994). 
Accordingly, a party must wait 180 days after filing a 
charge with the EEOC for ADA violations before being able 
to forego the administrative process and file suit in court. 
See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)(1). After 180 days, "[i]f a 
complainant is dissatisfied with the progress the EEOC is 
making on his or her charge of employment discrimination, 
he or she may elect to circumvent the EEOC procedures 
and seek relief through a private enforcement action in a 
district court." Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. EEOC, 
432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2451 (1977). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. At the oral argument before us a question was raised as to whether 
the district judge who heard Churchill I could dismiss Churchill II on the 
pleadings on the basis of the record. We are satisfied that the judge's 
review of the complaints in Churchill I and II and the answer in Churchill 
II adequately supported dismissal based on the face of the pleadings and 
that the outcome of this case did not hinge in the district court on the 
circumstance that the same judge heard Churchill I and Churchill II and 
thus had a special insight into the case. While we recognize that the 
Appellees did not attach copies of the pleadings from Churchill I to their 
answer in Churchill II as they might have pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
10(c), still in view of the circumstance that the operative facts are 
those 
in the pleadings in the two cases which are matters of public record, we 
decline to remand the matter to the district court so that the Appellees 
can amend their answer in Churchill II to include the pleadings from 
Churchill I which then would be "part [of the answer] for all purposes." 
Id. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 
998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) ("To decide a motion to dismiss, 
courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, 
exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.) 
(emphasis added); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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Similarly, a party must wait one year after filing charges 
with the PHRC for alleged PHRA violations before having 
the option to forego the state administrative process and file 
suit in court. PHRA provides that the PHRC shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative claim for one 
year after its filing, unless the PHRC resolves the claim 
before the one year has elapsed. See 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 962(c)(1).6 
 
As we discuss below, Churchill should have moved to 
consolidate Churchill I and Churchill II for they advanced 
the same cause of action. Churchill could have filed both 
the PHRA and ADA claims presented in Churchill II in time 
to join them with her FMLA claim in Churchill I. In the case 
of the PHRA claim, no special steps were needed to preserve 
that claim and join it to the FMLA action. On May 20, 
1997, the date Churchill filed Churchill I, the PHRC still 
was investigating her PHRA claim. The EEOC charge was 
held in abeyance pending the PHRC's investigation. The 
PHRC made a finding of no probable cause on the PHRA 
charge on November 14, 1997. Thus, prior to the start of 
the trial in Churchill I, Churchill knew that the PHRC had 
dismissed her PHRA complaint, and accordingly she could 
have brought an action on that claim about three months 
before Churchill I went to trial. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The PHRA provides in relevant part: 
 
       If within one (1) year after the filing of a complaint with the 
       Commission, the Commission dismisses the complaint or has not 
       entered into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a 
       party, the Commission must so notify the complainant. On receipt 
       of such a notice the complainant shall be able to bring an action 
in 
       the courts of common pleas of the Commonwealth based on the 
       right to freedom from discrimination granted by this act. If the 
court 
       finds that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an 
       unlawful discriminatory practice charged in the complaint, the 
court 
       shall enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful 
       discriminatory practice and order affirmative action which may 
       include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of 
employees, 
       granting of back pay, or any other legal or equitable relief as the 
       court deems appropriate. 
 
43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 962(c)(1). 
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As for the ADA claim, Churchill could have requested a 
right to sue letter after 180 days had passed from the filing 
date of her EEOC charge. "At the end of the 180-day period 
the employee is entitled to sue, regardless of EEOC 
proceedings." Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d 
Cir. 1984). Thus, on August 25, 1997, well before the 
Churchill I trial, she could have requested a right to sue letter.7 
The EEOC must issue the letter upon request. See 
McNasby v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 888 F.2d 270, 274 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). Churchill did not request a right to sue 
letter, instead waiting for the EEOC to issue it. Thus, she 
"sat on her rights" when she could have attempted to join 
the ADA claim to the FMLA claim in consolidated litigation. 
While Churchill argues that in some cases the EEOC may 
not respond promptly and correctly to such requests, we 
will not address the argument because she did not attempt 
to obtain the letter. 
 
Moreover, the district court correctly alternatively held 
that Churchill could have requested the court to stay 
Churchill I, while she waited for the right to sue letter, and 
by that procedural step preserved the PHRA and ADA 
claims now precluded. See Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 
630. Churchill points out that the court in Churchill I was 
aware of her pending administrative claims, and asserts 
that the court improperly and unfairly put "the 
responsibility of promoting the ideas of claim preclusion 
and judicial economy solely on [her] back." We reject that 
argument summarily. Attorneys should organize litigation 
that they are pursuing to avoid claim preclusion. 
Accordingly, the mere fact that the district court was aware 
of Churchill's administrative claims and sua sponte might 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The district court believed that because of the application of 42 
U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5(c) the 180-day period did not begin to run until after 60 days 
following Churchill's PHRA filing. See Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 630. 
We need not explore this point further because Churchill did not request 
a right to sue letter at any time and the addition of the 60 days to the 
180-day period would not affect our result as the extended period would 
have expired several months before the trial in Churchill I. We described 
the relationship between PHRA and EEOC proceedings in Trevino-Barton 
v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 919 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990). See also Berkoski 
v. Ashland Reg'l Med. Ctr., 951 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Pa 1997). 
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have stayed Churchill I did not relieve Churchill of the 
necessity to take steps to preserve her claims. See, e.g., 
Nernberg v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 752 (W.D. Pa. 
1979). 
 
Churchill argues that she made a motion for a stay at 
trial. In support of this assertion she refers to a side bar 
conference during Churchill I, in which the court excluded 
references to the administrative claims. The court did not 
permit reference to the PHRA and ADA claims because they 
were not being litigated along with the FMLA claim. While 
these evidentiary proceedings demonstrate that the court 
was aware of the administrative claims, they surely do not 
include a motion for a stay. In any event, if Churchill 
desired that the court stay Churchill I so that she could 
include her PHRA and ADA claims in that action, she 
should have asked for the stay before the trial. 
 
Churchill also argues that if the court stayed Churchill I 
she would have been prejudiced because FMLA offers 
equitable relief, such as reinstatement and resumption of 
benefits, which should not be delayed for reasons of judicial 
economy. Arguing that she sought a "prompt 
determination" of her FMLA claims, she contends that she 
now has been prevented unjustly from pursuing her rights 
under the ADA and PHRA. 
 
In considering this argument, we address the policy 
concerns behind FMLA which Congress enacted to promote 
job stability when workers confront illness or family 
emergencies. The FMLA history evinces Congress's intent to 
pass FMLA as an addition to federal labor laws establishing 
minimum standards for employment: 
 
       The [FMLA] accommodates the important societal 
       interest in assisting families, by establishing a 
       minimum labor standard for leave. The bill is based on 
       the same principle as the child labor laws, the 
       minimum wage, Social Security, the safety and health 
       laws, the pension and welfare benefit laws, and other 
       labor laws that establish minimum standards for 
       employment. 
 
S. Rep. No. 103-3 at 4, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6-7. 
 
                                12 
  
Congress stated that the purposes of FMLA include the 
following: "(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with 
the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic 
security of families, and to promote national interests in 
preserving family integrity; [and] (2) to entitle employees to 
take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or 
adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse or 
parent who has a serious health condition; . . ." FMLA 
S 2(b)(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. S 2601(b)(1), (2). 
 
In support of its decision to enact FMLA, Congress made 
several findings, including the recognition that"the primary 
responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, 
and such responsibility affects the working lives of women 
more than it affects the working lives of men; . . ." FMLA 
S 2(a)(2), (3), (5), 29 U.S.C. S 2601(a)(2), (3), (5). Given this 
background, it is clear that FMLA is intended to aid 
workers --especially but not exclusively working mothers 
like Churchill--maintain job stability when they must care 
for themselves or their family. Nevertheless, despite the 
substantive protection FMLA provides, we see no reason to 
hold that Congress intended in enacting FMLA that 
proceedings under the statute are not to be given preclusive 
effect in later litigation. Thus, while FMLA provides for 
equitable relief, including reinstatement, we cannotfind 
that this important legislative goal "trumps" long standing 
preclusive effect doctrines. 
 
Case law dealing with FMLA is limited. Churchill does not 
cite any case law to buttress her contention that an FMLA 
plaintiff is somehow due greater latitude than other 
plaintiffs with respect to the need to delay litigation in order 
to consolidate separate cases. To the contrary, federal 
courts thus far have viewed FMLA as similar to Title VII, 
the ADA, and other laws which protect employees. See, e.g., 
Holmes v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 1998 WL 564443, at *8 
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (FMLA, PHRA and ADA "protect the same 
interests and provide relief for the same violations"). 
 
We may look to case law under Title VII in assessing the 
situation of plaintiffs who do not seek a stay of an FMLA 
suit as they wait for an EEOC right to sue letter before 
asserting an ADA claim, or who for some other reason delay 
bringing an ADA claim. Three courts of appeals have held 
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that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case may 
have to forego administrative remedies and obtain an early 
right to sue letter. See Heyliger v. State Univ. and 
Community College Sys. of Tenn., 126 F.3d 849, 855 n.2 
(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1054 (1998); 
Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d 223, 225 
(7th Cir. 1993); and Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 
36, 40 (2d Cir. 1992). We agree with these persuasive 
decisions. 
 
In Heyliger, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
held that an employee's prior state court lawsuit against his 
employer under a state civil rights law prevented the 
employee from suing the employer in federal court for 
allegedly violating Title VII. The court determined that the 
state and federal claims arose out of the employer's 
decision not to renew the employee's contract, the state 
court had entered a valid and final judgment on merits of 
state claims, and the Title VII claim could have been added 
to the state claims. The court of appeals concluded that 
requiring a plaintiff in the circumstances in Heyliger to 
seek a right to sue letter and to amend his complaint to 
add the federal claim would not impose a burden on him 
beyond that of a due diligence standard. Id. at 856. 
Similarly, in Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assoc., Inc., 999 
F.2d at 225-26, the court held that the plaintiff, in order to 
avoid claim preclusion, had been obliged to seek a right to 
sue letter and join his Title VII claim with another, 
sufficiently related, pending federal action. Finally, in 
Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d at 40-41, the court 
precluded a Title VII action where the plaintiff could have 
sought a right to sue letter and an order to file an amended 
complaint in a pending federal case to include the Title VII 
claim. 
 
Thus, courts have rejected favoring "the language and 
policy of Title VII" as "against application of well-settled 
claim preclusion principles." Woods, 972 F.2d at 39. We do 
not find that the language and policy of FMLA is so 
different from that of Title VII as to "trump" the claim 
preclusion principles. Title VII, like FMLA, provides for back 
pay and front pay or reinstatement. 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e et 
seq. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, 25 F. Supp.2d 674, 678 
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(W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Accordingly, the harm to a successful plaintiff under both 
FMLA and Title VII will be mitigated in many cases by the 
accrual of back pay and prejudgment interest if she 
prevails. 
 
We recognize the burden placed upon working, single 
parents like Churchill in confronting their own serious 
illness or that of a family member, and acknowledge the 
protection offered by FMLA and the important interests it 
addresses. Yet Title VII similarly addresses injuries 
sustained by employees suffering discrimination, who 
wrongly may be forced from work and required to wait for 
redress in the form of reinstatement or back pay as they 
pursue their claims. Persons pursuing rights under these 
statutes must preserve their ability to seek redress in a 
manner compatible with longstanding principles of judicial 
economy: requesting a right to sue letter is not an onerous 
burden, and we believe that in many cases a motion to stay 
an FLMA action will preserve all legal claims without undue 
prejudice to the plaintiff. We believe that district courts are 
likely to look favorably on applications for stays of FMLA 
proceedings while plaintiffs promptly pursue administrative 
remedies under Title VII and similar state laws and we urge 
them to do so.8 
 
It is also important to bear in mind another point. 
Churchill I and II involved statutes with fee-shifting 
provisions. See 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(3) (FMLA); 43 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 962(c.2) (PHRA); 42 U.S.C. S 12205 (ADA). 
Thus, an employer held liable in consecutive actions 
without doubt will be confronted with multiple motions for 
attorney's fees and costs. Moreover, employers defending 
consecutive actions, whether or not the actions are 
successful, will incur greater attorney's fees and other 
expenses for their defenses than they would incur if 
defending only a single case. Surely it is only fair that such 
applications and expenses be avoided as the purpose of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Obviously we are not concerned here with a situation in which a court 
denied a diligent plaintiff's application for a stay in an FMLA action and 
thus precluded her from asserting her various claims in a single case. In 
those circumstances we might reach a different result. 
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statutes such as the FMLA, the PHRA, and the ADA is to 
provide protection for employees and to allow them to 
recover damages or other relief for employers' conduct if the 
employees can establish liability under the applicable 
statute. Congress did not pass the statutes for the purpose 
of generating legal fees for plaintiffs' and defendants' 
attorneys. We are not so naive that we do not recognize that 
if we reached a different result on the claim preclusion 
issue we would be encouraging knowledgeable plaintiffs' 
attorneys to bring separate cases to generate additional 
attorney's fees in situations in which a single case would 
suffice. Applying claim preclusion principles as we do will 
further the legitimate policy of avoiding unnecessary legal 
expenses. 
 
Overall, then, we are satisfied that in this case we should 
apply ordinary claim preclusion principles. Thus, we 
address the question of whether Churchill I and Churchill II 
involved the same cause of action so that Churchill II is 
precluded. 
 
       2. The cause of action. 
 
The purpose of claim preclusion is to avoid piecemeal 
litigation of claims arising from the same events. See Board 
of Trustees of Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare 
Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992). "[A] 
final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the 
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or 
could have been raised in that action." Rivet v. Regions 
Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 473, 118 S.Ct. 921, 925 
(1998) (internal citation omitted). A determination of 
whether two lawsuits are based on the same cause of 
action "turn[s] on the essential similarity of the underlying 
events giving rise to the various legal claims." Board of 
Trustees, 983 F.2d at 504, quoting U.S. v. Athlone Indus., 
Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984). Because the courts 
have not defined precisely "causes of action," for claim 
preclusion purposes, we take a broad view, focussing on 
the underlying events of the two actions. Athlone, 746 F.2d 
at 984. 
 
Claim preclusion gives dispositive effect to a prior 
judgment if "a particular issue, although not litigated, could 
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have been raised in the earlier proceeding. Claim preclusion 
requires: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit 
involving; (2) the same parties or their privities; and (3) a 
subsequent suit based on the same cause of action." Id. 
"Courts should not apply this conceptual test mechanically, 
but should focus on the central purpose of the doctrine, to 
require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out the same 
occurrence in a single suit." Id. 
 
The Appellees clearly demonstrated the presence of the 
first two requirements set forth in Athlone  when they 
sought judgment in their favor in Churchill II and Churchill 
acknowledges this point. There had been a final judgment 
on the merits in Churchill I, and Churchill I and II involved 
the same parties. As for the third requirement, i.e., whether 
the cause of action was the same, the district court 
properly concluded that the case "involve[d] the same cause 
of action because the underlying events in both cases are 
the same," as the acts complained of were the same, and 
the evidence at the trial would have been the same. While 
Churchill cited different statutes to support her two cases, 
the FMLA in Churchill I and the ADA and PHRA in Churchill 
II, the court correctly observed that the fact that Churchill 
advanced different legal theories does not mean that her 
second action will not be precluded. 
 
Churchill contends that Churchill II differs from Churchill 
I because the Churchill II complaint introduced "new 
material facts" and "new elements of . . . damages." She 
argues in particular that the following "new material facts" 
were presented as "additional allegations" in the Churchill II 
complaint: (1) David Smith replaced temporary supervisor 
Walter Schreiber in October 1996; (2) in Churchill II she 
listed side effects including fatigue, depression, weight loss, 
loss of appetite, difficultly swallowing, dry mouth, sores in 
the mouth, and limited range of movement in the neck; 
(3) Smith informed Jantorno of her requests for 
accommodation; (4) Jantorno then scheduled an "untimely" 
evaluation of Churchill and asked Smith to conduct an 
evaluation; and (5) Smith and Jantorno consulted with 
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Deborah Cox of the Human Resources Department of Star 
Staff, as to how to deal with the situation.9 
 
Indeed, these were new allegations but the thrust of the 
two complaints remained practically identical. See Harding 
v. Duquesne Light Co., 1995 WL 916926 at *3 (W.D. Pa. 
1995) (no showing of different "causes of actions" where 
complaints "practically identical"). In each complaint, 
Churchill stated where, when and for whom she worked, 
that she was diagnosed for cancer in the summer of 1996, 
had three surgeries and radiation treatment, that she 
sought staff assistance as an accommodation to her 
medical condition, that several requests for accommodation 
were ignored and that she was fired as a result of her 
disability and medical needs and efforts to receive the 
accommodation she claimed was due. Moreover, in 
Churchill II she was seeking a recovery for essentially the 
same wrongful conduct for which she obtained a recovery 
in Churchill I. 
 
Thus, we conclude that the district court properly found 
that the claims were the same under Athlone, and that 
claim preclusion should apply. There is simply no escaping 
from the fact that Churchill has relied on different legal 
theories to seek redress from the Appellees for a single 
course of wrongful conduct. Because the claims were the 
same, Churchill asserted a single cause of action in both 
cases that the doctrine of claim preclusion required her to 
have joined in one suit. Thus, this case at bottom is simply 
a classic example of splitting a cause of action. 10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Specifically, Churchill I's complaint does not specify that Smith 
replaced Schreiber, but merely identifies Schreiber as her temporary 
supervisor, and identifies Smith as "at all times [Churchill's] Manager"; 
states that Churchill had and was treated for cancer, but does not 
specify the side effects suffered; states that on January 29, 1997, 
"[Churchill] provided sufficient notice to Defendant Smith that she had 
a serious medical need which qualified [Churchill] for Family Medical 
Leave," but otherwise does not describe how the Appellees became aware 
of her condition, and does not include information about the evaluation 
and how Cox was involved. 
 
10. It should not be thought that by artful pleading of unnecessary 
allegations in a second complaint a plaintiff can avoid the result we 
reach. 
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B. The Remaining issues 
 
As we indicated, the Appellees have filed a cross-appeal 
from the denial of sanctions under Rule 11 and Churchill 
has filed an appeal from the denial of certain attorney's fees 
and costs in Churchill I. We have reviewed these appeals 
carefully and have concluded that they are without merit. 
Thus, we will affirm on these appeals without further 
discussion. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order entered 
May 28, 1998, on appeal in No. 98-1491, denying 
reconsideration of the order with respect to counsel fees 
and costs, and will affirm the order entered June 23, 1998, 
on appeal on Nos. 98-1632 and 98-1700, granting the 
Appellees judgment on the pleadings but denying their 
motion for sanctions. 
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